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IMPERFECT COMPETITION, EXPECTATIONS AND
THE MULTIPLE EFFECTS OF MONETARY
GROWTH~`
Neil Rankin
We show that imperfect competition intensifies the problem of how to model
expectations in macroeconomics. If agents are assumed to forecast in a
`backward-looking' manner, then, despite confining attention to forecasting
rules wtiich ensure no errors in the steady state, there is a continuum ofsteady
states with difTerent properties, each associated with a diíTerent forecasting
rule. By contrast, under perfect competition, or in `ad hoc', non-optimising
macromodels, any forecasting method which ultimately eliminates mistakes
results in a unique steady state, with unique properties. If, on the other hand,
agents are assumed to forecast in a`forward-looking' manner, i.e. to have
perfect foresight, then the steady state will be unique. However, such an
expectations assumption not only requires agents to have much greater
knowledge about the working of the economy than in perfectly competitive
economies, but the information needed concerns out-of-equilibrium behaviour,
which by definition is never actually observed.
The dependence of the stea~ly state on the forecasting rule results from the
fact that the rule is one factor which determines the elasticity of demand faced
by imperfectly competitive agents. Since elasticities are central to the conditions
which determine an imperfectly competitive equilibrium, the forecasting rule
has an infiuence on the equilibrium, which remains present even when the
economy is in a steady state with validated expectations. The lack of such an
in(luence under perfect competition is because the elasticity of demand faciug
agents is then exogenous: by assumption, in6nity. Another way to view
forecasting-rule dependence is to rnote that although backward-looking rules
may imply correct forecasts everywhere along the equilibrium time path of an
econumy,' with respect to behaviour ofi the equilibrium time path they irnply
errors, and difl~erent rules imply ditierent errors. This distinction does not aríse
under perfcct competition, since a deviation by one agent from her equilibrium
~ P.,n uf thu ..urk wu dune during a stay as a Kesearch Felluw at the Cruter fur Ecunurnk Krsearch,
~filburg l'nivenity, whuse huspitality I would like to acknowledge, and waz partly linanced by the N~~'O,
ro which I arn alw grarrful. Thanks fur uscful commcnts to Huw Dixon, John Dri1Ti11, Christian Schulrz, and
an auonymous relerrr.
' 7 he cxistcncc ul a class ul rulcs which implies no errurs in rhe short as wrll as in thr lung run will tx
shown.
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stratc~y there has no efí~ect on future (or current) prices, and so requires no
chant;c in other agents' forecasts.
The urganisation of the paper is as follows. Section I describes the structure
of the mudel, which is a monetary overlapping-generations model with
impcr(èct competition in the labour market, inspired by the seminal work of
Hart ( tq8z). "I-he contrasting e(Tects ofchanges in monetary growth on steady-
state output undcr difièrent forecasting rules are studied in Section II, and an
illustratiun using a CES parameterisation is provided in Section III. Section IV
considers the robustness of forecasting-rule dependence.
I. TI1E STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
In outline, the economy contains two homogeneous commodities - goods and
labour - and a single asset - non-interest-bearing money, whose supply is
exogenously determined by the government. There are three types of private-
sector agent: firms, households and trade unions. Firms are price- and
wage-takers who produce goods using labour as the sole input. Households are
composed of overlapping generations with two-period lives, and form a con-
stant population. Each household works only when young and is exogenously
assigned to a trade union. The union's objective, as in Hart ( t g82), is to
maximise the money wage revenue of its members. This is consistent with
maximising members' utilities since no utility of leisure is assumed, something
which also implies that the underlying competitive labour supply just equals
the sum of households' exogenous time endowments. Imperfect competition
takes the form of a Cournot quantity-setting oligopoly between unions.~
Imperfect competition is what gives the model interest as a theory of output
and employment determination, since with a Walrasian labour market
employment would equal the competitive labour supply and so be exogenous.
VVith a unionised labour market, the equilibrium involves unemployment for
some subset of the parameter space, creating scope in principle for monetary
policy to afíect output.
Op[imisation Prob[ems of Indiiidua[ Agenls
In each local labour market3 there are n identical unions. The problem which
union i faces is:
maximise l~'L, subject to Li-f L' - g(W;... ) and L, ~ L, ( t)
L, is tlie quantity of labour sold by union i, and L is its labour endowment. L' is
the labour sales of the other n-1 unions, which are taken as given by union i
under the Cournot assumption. g( W; ...) is the market labour demand function,
r The mudcl difíers from Hart's (a) by dispensing with oligopoly in the goods market, which is inessential
for prexnt purposcs, (b) by explicitly including money rather than a' non-produccd good', and (c) by being
dynamic rathcr than static. A static vcrsion, which looks at the ncutrality, as opposed to thc supcrncutrality,
of moncy, is constructcd in Rankin ( tggz). Por survcys of the general litcrature on tha macrueconomics of
imperfect compctition to which these papers rclatq see Silvestre (tggt) and Dixon and Rankin (tggt).
s Like Hart, we di~ide thr economy into a large number of separate but identical locations. To avoid
notational clutter, these are not formally indexed. Each firm is tied to a locatíon where it draws labour from
thc lucal labuur market and sells it in the local goods market. Each household is allocated to one location
as a workcr, to a diRercnt one as a consumer, and to yet a third as a shareholder. This ensures that a union
isjustified in taking its members' consumption prices and profit reccipts as given; and in taking the incomes
uf iu firms' customcrs as given.
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whose exact form will be determined below. From the first-order condition for
solving ( t), assuming an equilibríum which is symmetric across the n unions so
that Lt - L~n (L - Lt f L'), we obtain the central relationship :
r~n ~-E(6V;... ), t~n ~ L, with complementary slack, (s)
where E( W; ... ) - [ag( . )~c~W] [W~L], (3)
e is the money-wage elasticity of the market labour demand function g( .), and
so in general a function of the same variables. Our interest centres on the case
where L~n e L, i.e. on equilibrium with unemployment, in which case the first
part of (~) holds as a strict equality.~
Firms are perfect competitors in all markets. The representative firm has a
concave production function y- f(L) and so maximises profits wltere W~p -
f(L). Inverting this yields the decreasing labour demand function L- Ld(w),
where w- 61i~p. For future reference, define the real-wage elasticity of labour
demand as e~ - [dLa(w)~dw] [w~L], and note that in general it can be regarded ,
as a function of any one of (w, L, y). The form of the function clearly depends
purely on the form of the production function f(L). We similarly define the
output supply function y- y'(w) (-f(Ld(w))) and the real-wage elasticity of
output supply, es - [dy'(w)~dw] [w~y].
The tliird type ofagent is the consumer, whose lifetime optimisation problem
is :
maximise u(c,~,col) subject to Y,fS; -p,c, ~-M„ ~L1,-1-Sol -p„lcot.
Superscripts Y, 0 denote respectively the young and old generation in any
period. c, indicates consumption, Mr nominal money balances held at the end
of period l, Y nominal income from wages and profits. Yt is also national income
(per location), since only the young earn wages and for convenience we assume
thcy also receive all profits. S,~,.So are lump-sum subsidies, by means of which
the government increases or decreases [he money supply. We assume
preferences to be homothetic, sp that the resulting demand functions have the
forms (the implicit non-negativity constraint on M, is taken never to bind) :
~~~ - a(Pt.t~pt) [YfS; -fSo.t]~Pt, co - [~tif,-,-t-So]~pr, (4)
x( fi~,t~p,) is a function which is decreasing if current and future consumption
are gross substitutes in consumers' preferences, increasing if they are gross
complements. Note that the expression for co is just a rean-angement of the
budget constraint.
Total goods demand at a location in period ~ is simply the sum of the two
demands in (~}). An important variable is the price elasticity of total goods
demand, which we denote eo. ep is a weighted average of the elasticities of the
two components of demand, the weights being their sháres in total
consumption. For the old's demand, the elasticity is clearly just - t. For tlte
young's demand, the calculation of the elasticity must take into account the
t Cunca~~ity uf M~agc revenue in the wage, i.e. satisfaction oC the second-order conditiutts for (s) to deGne
a rnaximum, cannut iu general tx taleen for granted. A set of sufficient conditions fur concavity is presented
iu a lungcr .-cn~un of the papcr, Raulcin (t99t).
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fact that, under backward-looking expectations, a change in pt may afTect the
consumer's forecast of ptt„ which thus provides a further mechanism for a
change in demand. Denote the forecasting rule very generally asp,~r -`Y(S2t),
where S2t is the sct of current and past variables on which the consumer bases
her forecast. If i2t includes the current price pt, `Y( .) will imply some elasticity
of expectations y, where y-[c~p~,l~~pt] [pt~p~fl]. Diflerentiating the young's
dernand with respect to pt, and using this in the weighted-average expression
for total demand elasticity, we then obtain:
eo - - t - [c~ ~ya] [t -Y] [pitr~pt] a~(pitr~pe)~a(péfr~pr). (5)
The presence of y in this expression is the key to the dependencé of the
equilibrium on the forecasting rule, as will be seen. Under the alternative
assumption of perfect foresight, p„1 is treated as if direcdy observable by
consumers, and so no subjective link is made to pt. The elasticity in this case is
found by setting y- o (and p14r - pt,l) in (5).
Alterna[iue Expec[a[ions Hypolheses
A backward-looking forecasting rule may be the outcome of a relatively
sophisticated learning process, such as an OLS regression, or simply a plausible
but ad hoc rule of thumb. For example, the class of autoregressive rules in the
inflation rate may be represented as:
m
ln (pitr~pt) - ~ ~tln (pt-t~pt-t-r)- (6)r-a
The condition for this to yield a correct forecast in a constant-inflation steady
state is E~o.lr - t. Consistently with this, the implied elasticity ofexpectations,
y, can take any value, since it is given by c~lnpi,l~c~lnpt - t-~.10, and ~la may
be chosen arbitrarily.b
Autoregressive rules, however, exclude other variables which may be
relevant to predicting inflation, such as the money supply. A simple forecasting
rule which uses this is `monetarist' expectations:
p~;~lpt - Mt~Mt-t. (~)
Since inflation must equal the monetary growth rate in a steady state, this too
ensures a correct long-run forecast. In fact below we will see that it yields
correct forecasts in all time periods, for the particular type of policy which we
consider. From (7) it is immediate that monetarist expectations imply y- t.
To implement the alternative hypothesis of forward-looking expectations, we
simply assume, as already indicated, that consumers have perfect foresight
concerning ptt~. Whereas our backward-looking forecasting behaviour satisfies
only a weak criterion of `rationality' - that forecasting errors should be
eliminated in the long run - forward-looking forecasting behaviour satisfies a
rationality criterion which is stronger on two counts. First, it guarantees no
forecasting errors in the short and medium runs, as well as in the long run.
However, as noted, some backward-looking rules such as monetarist
s Thc most Camiliar vcrsion of (6) is 'adaptive' expectations where In (p~„~p,)-In (p~~p~-,) ~ 1[In
(P~~D~-i)-~n (P~~D~-~)).o e x e t, so we have y~ t ta ~ t.
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expectations are capable of ensuring this too, and indeed we shall see that a
whole class of rules can be constructed which ensure it, and yet each implies a
difl'erent steady state. The reason this is possible is that such rules still imply
forecast errocs with respect to actions by imperfectly competitive agents which
take the economy ofi~ an equilibrium time path. That is, the efTect on p,tl of a
unilateral deviation by union i from its utility-maximising choice of Li~ is
incorrectly forecast by such rules. The forward-looking expectations hypothesis
imposes correct forecasts with respect to such deviations, and thus satisfies a
stronger criterion of rationality. It, of course, does not follow from this that it
is necessarily a better description of actual forecasting behaviour. It requires
much more knowledge about the structure of the economy than is required for
forward-looking expectations in competitive economies, where a deviation by
an agent from his utility-maximising choice has a negligible efíect on prices and
so requires no adjustment to forecasts by other agents. Moreover, since by
definition the economy is always on its equilibrium time path, it is hard to see
how agents could ever observe mistakes in their forecasts with respect to out-
of-equilibrium behaviour, and so learn to form true forward-looking
expectations.
Definilion oJ Equilibrium
The clearing condition for equilibrium in a local goods market may now be
written as:
y'(W~~P~)-a(p~ti~P~)[Y~-f-Si fsoti]~Pif[M~-tf~]~p~. (8)
Taking into account that under backward-looking expectations p;,.l -`Y(S2,)
where in general f2~ contains p~, this makes the local goods price p~ an implicit
function of several variables: the local money wage W„ the money income of
local consumers Y~, their initial money balances M~-1, current and expected
future subsidies, and any further variables in S2i apart from pi itself (call them
f2; ). This function we summarise as p(W,,... ). Using it to substitute out p~ from
the labour demand function oClocal firms, we obtain:
L-Ld(We~1i(Wi,...))-8(WiiY,Mi-i,si,si,~ti~~i). (9)
This reveals what underlies the market labour demand function first introduced
in (i). It diN'ers from the labour demand function of a firm because it
endogenises the price level: unions know that by restricting employment and
pushing up the local wage, they will also push up the local price, and take this
into account. Therefore its form depends on three factors: firms' technology
f( .), consumers' preferences u( .), and - most importantly for our purposes -
consumers' forecasting rule `Y( . ).
Under forward-looking expectations the forecasting rule `Y(. ) is replaced by
the condition p~,l - p„1. p„1 thus becomes an argument ofg( .), in place of S~~ .
~Vhen labour demand elasticity e is calculated by taking the partial log-
derivative ofg( .) with respect to W~, ít is thus implicitly assumed that the true
p„1 faced by local consumers is unafTected when local unions push up Wi and
thus p,. For this [o be valid, we need to add the rider that consumers at the
location are dispersed amongst new locations in the second period of life, so that
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any in(luence of a change in p, on the money stock which a consumer decides
to carry over does not significantly affect the total demand, and therefore the
price, in his new locauon.e
Having elucidated ttie relationships underlying g(. ), by difTerentiating (8)
and (g) we may ohtain an expression for E in terms of its constituent elasticities:
E- EL ED, [ES } Ep~ r (to)
whcre eL, ES, ED were defined above. Using this in the labour market
eyuilibrium condition ( 2) (focusing on the equilibriwn with unemployment)
gives : t ~n -- EL En~ [ES f en~. ( I t)
Or: -EO - ss(yt)~[t ~neL(9t)~ - z(yt), say. (t~)
~ti'e noted earlier that eL, es may be viewed as functions of yr, so that the right
hand side of ( t 2) is a function of yt whose form depends purely on the form of
the production function j(. ). Substituting out -eo by (5), we have:
t f [ei ~ya~ [t -Y~ ~itr~pt~ a~(i~i,rri~t)~a(pitr~pe) - Z(yt). (t3)
To close tlie model, we impose symmetry across locations. This means that
the value of output at a location, pryt, must equal the money income of
consumers who spend there, Y,. Using this in the consumption demand
functions (4) , we obtain the following expressions for aggregate demand and
the consumption share of the young generation:
yt-a(pi.r~pe)[ytf[Si }~fi)~pe)f[Mt-tf~~~pt~ (t4)
ci Iye - a(pitr~pr) [t -f [Si fSoti]~ptyr~- (t5)
Under backward-looking expectations, ( t 3)-( t S) together with the forecasting
rule p;,t -`fr(t2t) ( and a similar rule for Soti) determine ( pt,yt,c, ~yt). Under
forward-looking expectations, these variables are determined by ( I 3)-( t 5)
together with p~,l - p,tt, So;i - So~l, and y- o. In the first case, the period-!
equilibrium is in general contingent on lagged variables, as components of f2r,
so to trace out the complete time path requires the solution of a system of
backward-looking difïerence equations. In the second case it is contingent on
tlie future variable pt,r, so the time path is described by a forward-looking
difTerence equation system, for which the standard solution is to employ a
`saddlepatli' criterion.'
Il. STEADY-STATE BEHAVIOUR
In this section we solve for the steady state and show how the eH'ect on it of
changes in the rate of growth of the money supply are sensitive to the
forecasting rule. Assume that the government chooses a constant rate of
''I'he alternativc assumption in which forward causation from p, to p„t is allowed would enrich the
analysis under forward-looking expectatiorts, but this would be a distraction from the main point which we
seek to makc in the paper.
' A lungcr vcrsion of the papcr ( Rankin, tggt ) contains an analysis of the local stability of the steady state
under diRcrcnt expectations assumptions. Ensuring the appropriate degree of stability poxs no unusual
problcros. Thc analysis is omiucd hcre since it is unrevealing for the steady state comparative uatics.
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monetary growth, B(which could be negative). Monetary expansion
(contraction) occurs through the lump-sum subsidies (taxes). If fraction ~ of
the total subsidy goes to the old generation, then subsidies are given by
S, -[ t -~] B~bf,-„ .S~ -~dM,-„ S, f So - M, - M,-, - DAf,-,. ( r 6)
A steady state must involve constant values over time of all real variables. 1'0
keep real money balances constant the inftation rate must thus equal 9, and
since expectations are by construction always validated in a steady state, tlte
expected in(lation rate equals B too. Using this fact and substituting (t6) into
( r 3)-( t 5),e we derive the following steady-state version of ( t g) :
t ~- [t -Y] [t -F8]Za'(t fB)~[t fBa(t tB)] - (-eD) - z(y)~ (t7)
Equation ( t ~) determines the steady state output level, y, as an implicit
Cunction of the monetary growth rate, B. It is valid for both backward- and
forward-looking expectations, with only the restriction that y- o under the
latter.
The ef~ect of an increase in B on y clearly depends, first, on whether the left
hand side of ( r ~), which is the steady state value of the price elasticity of
demand -eo, is increasing or decreasing in B; and, second, on whether the
z( y) function on the right hand side of ( t ~) is increasing or decreasing in y. It is
in fact most likely that the z(y) function is increasing, as the CES example in
the next section illustrates. Whether -ep is increasing or decreasing depends
on whether [ t f B]~a'~[t~ BaJ is increasing or decreasing in 6, and on the sign
of r- y. From this last we directly see the dependence of the steady state on the
forecasting rule. Since difTerent forecasting rules imply different values of the
elasticity of expectations y, as pointed out in the previous section, it follows that
they also imply difTerent efTects of an increase in B on long-run output. For
example, under `monetarist' expectations y- t, whence -eo - r, and
monetary growth has no efTect on output (money is `superneutral'). Under
`adaptive' expectations y~ r, so that whatever the sign ofdy~d~, it is opposite
to the sign under forward-looking expectations, for which y- o. In general,
any two backward-looking forecasting rules which embody difTerent values for
the elasticity oC expectations y will imply difierent efTects of monetary growth
on steady-state output.
lt must be stressed that these difl'erences do not result from diflèrent forecast
errors made under difierent forecasting rules, since such errors are absent by
assumption in the steady state. Nor do they result Crom diFTerent forecast errors
made in the short run along the transition path to the steady state. We can
illustrate this by showing that under `monetarist' expectations, furecasts are
correct in the short as well as in the long run, and yet we have just seen that
the long-run behaviour oC the economy is difTerent from that under forward-
looking expectations where there are also no short-run errors. Since y- r
under monetarist expectations, ( t 3) shows that output is determined
exogcnously by t- z( y,) in every period, not just in the long ruu. Using this
s J~;~ is as~umed to Ix forecast as ( i tBJ.S~, which is always a corrcct forecast except just prior to an
unanticipatcd ~hangr in B.
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output level (y,,, say) in the aggregate demand equation (t4), together with
(t6) and the monetarist rule p~tt~p, - t~-B itself, we obtain the equation:
y~ - [I -a(t f8))-t[I -f~B] [I fBa(I fB))Mt-t~pt. (t8)
This shows that real balances must be constant for all l, and thus that pt must
grow at the same rate as M,-t in all periods, i.e. at B, exactly as the monetarist
forecasting rule predicts. Note that under this simple rule the economy reaches
its steady state immediately.9,'o
The fundamental reason for the multiplicity of steady states generated by
difíerent forecasting rules is that difïerent rules imply difTerent mistakes by
households in forecasting the efíects of deviations by unions from their utility-
maximising strategies. Under our assumption that consumers are reshu(filed
between locations in the second period of life, a union which pushes up the local
price pt has no efïect on the true pt,l which local consumers face, yet backward-
looking consumers will respond by raising their expected prices by an amount
which depends on y. This changes their current demand for the good in a way
which is taken into account by unions, who know the true labour demand
curve which they face. Because consumers' errors are errors in forecasting
hypothetical, not necessarily actual, behaviour, there is no reason why
consumers who, through a process of learning or trial-and-error, have arrived
at a successful forecasting method, should have any incentive to change it. The
powerful `rational expectations' argument that forecasting rules which imply
indefinitely repeated errors will be rejected no longer suffices to tie down long
run behaviour.
III. A CES EXAMPLE
We now provide a concrete illustration of the steady-state comparative statics.
If the production function is CES over labour and capital, where capital is a
fixed parameter, then we may derive an explicit form for the function z(y).'t
To ensure an unemployment equilibrium exists in thc `benchmark' case where
y--EO - I, i.e. that ( I~) can be satis6ed, we need the elasticity ofsubstitution
Q to be less than I ~n, which yields a z( y) function with the shape shown in Fig.
1. Noting (t2), a positive slope of z(y) implies that an increase in output is
caused by anything which increases the elasticity of goods demand. This is
what we would expect intuitively: a rise in -eD lowers unions' monopoly
power and so weakens their monopolistic restriction of employment and
output.
s Thc point in this paragraph may be further emphasiaed by noting that a complete clau of (orecasting
rulcs which yield no short-run crron can be cotutructtd, one for each value of y. Consider:
A~a~O~ ~ ke[t tBI IOt~Mt-s~'-s.
[n a steady statc with y given by ( t 7) this witt forecut correctly providcd ks is choun such that ~ke a m~-t,
where m is steady-state real balances ( and thercfore dependent on B). It is atraightforward to obtain an
equation similar to ( t8) and so show again that p, must grow at the same rate as M,-, in every period t,
whrncc the systcm is always in the steady state and so yictds correct forecasts in evcry t.
'o The success of the monetarist forccasting rule (and of the rula in the prcceding footnote) is of courae
contingent on the policy regime, as with any backward-looking rule. It would brcak down if, for example,
the governmcnt chose a dynamic time path for B rather than fixed it permanently.
t' The function uxd 'u: y z A[Qk'"~t't" t ( t -~JLts-ui']"it''n, where c~ o, o e ~, n e t. A fuller
cxposition of iu implications for z(y) is givcn in Rankin (t99z).
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The e(iect off~ on the steady-state e[asticity ofguods demand, -E~, dcpeuds
on the sign of y- ~ and on whether the term [ ~~- B]ta'~ [ ~ t Ba] is increasing
or decreasing in 9(see ( t 7)). To examine the latter we use the CES utility
function, with an e[asticity ofintertemporal substitution in consumption ofp.`~
From this we may derive :
-EO - ~ -[~ -Yl [t -P]~{[t t~[t tB]'-o] [i f8-~[~ fB]N-~]}. (ty)
The function (~y) is sketched in Fig. 2. There are four cases, depending on the
signs ofy- ~ and p- t. As already seen, changing the sign ofy-.i reverses the
eflèct of H on -eU and hence on y. This is visible in that panels (c) and (d) are
the mirror images of (a) and (b). Fig. 2 also shows that the sign of p- i is
important. Under gross substitutability between current and future con-
sumption (p 1 i), an increase in B has the opposite efTect on -E~ (for values
" 7'hc CES utiliry function is: u 3([cY)~-tuvtd(coJ~tuo)P~~'~ whcrc V~ o, o~ d c[.
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ofp in the lower range) to its efl~ect under gross complementarity (p e r). Two
eftècts are at work in causing ehese changes. First, just as in the competitive
pure exchange model, higher t9 increases the young generation's share in total
consumption. This weights total demand elasticity towards that of the young,
and since the latter is greater ( in absolute terms) than that of the old as
[y- t] [p- t] e o or ~ o respectively, this raises - eo in cases ( b) and (c),
lowers it in ( a) and ( d). Second, higher B afíects the young's demand elasticity
itself, positively ify~ t, negatively if C t. Since the sign of the efTect does not
depend on the sign of p- t, it reinforces the 6rst efTect in cases (b) and
(d) but counteracts it in (a) and ( c), causing the trough and hill shapes in the
latter.13
1V. ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS
Our broad conclusion, already stated in the introduction, is the negative one
that imperfect competition exacerbates the problem of modelling expectations
in macroeconomics. In the present model, it is impossible to predict the long-
run efI'ect of higher monetary growth on output unless either we make the
extremely informationally-demanding assumption of forward-looking expec-
tations, or we select one out of an infinity of perfectly accurate backward-
looking forecasting rules as being more likely. Imperfect competition mea'ns
that we must pay more attention to the issue of how agents forecast, since it is
important for the long run and not just the short run, as in competitive
economies.
Not all dynamic models of imperfectly competitive economies necessarily
exhibit this Corecasting-rule dependence: several features are necessary for it to
occur. However it is a general property of imperfectly competitive models
insofar as many other models can be envisaged which will generate it, and
unless care is taken deliberately to exclude the features which give rise to it,
such a phenomenon is likely to encountered from time to time in future
research on the macroeconomics of imperfect competition. A first requirement,
which should already be clear from the foregoing, is that unions must be able
to influence goods prices. ~Vithout this the elasticity of goods demand is
irrelevant Cor the elasticity of labour demand faced by unions, and thus so are
consumers' Corecasting rules. For example the framework used by Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (tg87) does not satisfy this, since each firm employs a very small
arnount of the labour of each union, so that the elasticity of demand faced by
the latter is determined solely by tlie firm's technology.
A second necessary feature is an intertemporal substitution effect. In the
present model, this operates through consumption. It is easy to see that if
consumption is unafi~ected by a change in the intertemporal relative goods
price of goods (i.e. by the real interest rate), then forecasting-rule dependence
disappears: this is the case a' - o ín (t3). While the sign and magnitude of the
" A turollary of these elfccts uf B on y is that the optimal rate of monetary growth di(icrs frum that in a
compctitivc cconomy. In the latter (assuming no discounting of future geueratiuns' utilities in the sucial
welfare function) the optimum growth rate is zero, since this minimises the dístributional distortions. Here
the distributional distonions must be wcighed against beneficial output etiects of nun-zero infiation. In cast
(c), for cxamplq thc optimum will lie at somc B bctween zcro and thc output-maximising value.
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intertemporal substitution efíect on consumption are still a matter of empirical
controversy, the introduction of investment to the model would provide a
second, and more powerful, channel for such an efTect to operate.
A final requirement ( though this would not apply if the efí~ect were through
investment) is tliat the consumer should spend a non-negligible fraction of her
income on the good in imperfectly competitive supply. In our model the
consumer buys only one type of good, from a single source of supply ( firms at
the consumer's location, whose common price is under the in(luence of the local
unions). We could relax this somewhat, but not as far as the `monopolistic
competition' framework popular in much of the literature, in which each
consumer buys a large number of goods, such that the price of a single good has
a negligible efTect on the index of prices relevant for the consumer. With the
CES utility function used in this literature, demand for good i depends on its
own price and on the index of all prices. A rise in the current price of a single
good, i, altliough it may cause tlie consumer to forecast a rise in the future price
of good i, and maybe in the future prices of other goods j, will still under any
likely forecasting rule have a negligible eR~ect on the price index, so that the
forecasting rule will be irrelevant to the consumer's elasticity of demand.
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